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Logistics in Support of Operations Other Than War

by

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
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of the requirement for the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not  
necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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**ABSTRACT**  
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**LOGISTICS IN SUPPORT OF OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR**

The US military services provide excellent self-support in the operations they perform. Operations Other Than War (OOTW) require careful planning, coordination and execution by many agencies which requires a different approach than US forces are accustomed too. There is a lack of effort at all levels in providing logistics planning and execution for OOTW. This analysis will reflect this trend and provide some recommendations on how to solve this dilemma.

US forces will be involved in Operations Other Than War (OOTW) for the next several decades. It is important that these operations are successful. Well coordinated logistics support is vital to the favorable completion of OOTW.

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## INTRODUCTION

*I have directed the United States Secretary of Defense to place a new emphasis on peacekeeping. We will emphasize training of combat, engineering and logistical units for the full range of peacekeeping and humanitarian activities.*

President George Bush, UN General Assembly, September 1992

Since 1991, the United States Military has participated in diverse Operations Other Than War (OOTW) under the umbrella of “peacekeeping and humanitarian activities.” These operations have ranged from humanitarian and peacekeeping operations in Somalia (RESTORE HOPE and CONTINUE HOPE) to domestic situations in Los Angeles (Joint Task Force-Los Angeles) and Florida (Hurricane Andrew).

Logistics support of US forces performing these missions is critical. Joint Vision 2010 notes:

**Focused logistics will be the fusion of information, logistics, and transportation technologies to provide rapid crisis response, to track and shift assets even while enroute, and to deliver tailored logistics packages and sustainment directly at the strategic, operational, and tactical level of operations.<sup>1</sup> (emphasis provided)**

General Frederick Franks, Commanding General, Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), and Commander, VII Corps during the Gulf War, stated: “At the corps level, logistics is operations and operations is logistics.”<sup>2</sup> He also said that logistics “...will be a lot of tailoring, a lot of versatility, a lot of adapting and improvisation.”<sup>3</sup> Though General Franks’ comment reflected experience in the Gulf War (larger in concept than most OOTW requiring US involvement), his

evaluation includes the importance and difficulties of logistics to support any operation.

Logistics support for OOTW needs study. The US military services provide excellent self-support in the operations they perform. The Navy deploys with ninety days of support on board and uses a well-established logistics support system. The Army and Air Force routinely use rapid deployment support from the Air Mobility Command (AMC) to provide surge and sustainment. Nonetheless, most US military logisticians lack sufficient understanding of the particular requirements for effective logistics support to US forces involved in OOTW. There are resources available to help logistics planners:

For OOTW missions that require deployment outside the continental United States, logisticians can check files maintained by the International Red Cross, the United Nations, and USAID, among others. These sources can provide data on relief supplies, host-nation resources, methods of obtaining critical support from multinational sources, and cultural characteristics of the area of operations....Each OOTW situation requires detailed coordination and execution of operations in accordance with international law and agreements. Most OOTW missions involve complex legal issues affecting logistics cooperation.<sup>4</sup>

Operations Other Than War require careful planning, coordination and execution by many agencies. These include non-governmental agencies (NGOs), private voluntary organizations (PVOs), local governments, local paramilitaries, US government agencies, the United Nations (UN), Country Teams (US Embassy), coalition forces, and other US military forces. The complexity of

coordinating logistics efforts is significant, and understanding this at the beginning of any OOTW is vital.

### **Purpose**

Commanders must work with a mix of governments and agencies to ensure unity of effort for logistics at all levels. This paper examines some of the problems associated with lack of unity during OOTWs. These problems include contingency planning, command and control and logistics on arrival.

Continual planning, exercising and coordinating with all potential agencies is a must to prepare for various situations. There can never be an all-encompassing solution, but with close correlation, practice and innovation, inherent obstacles in conducting OOTW logistical support can be overcome.

Service parochialism is particularly keen in this arena. "Historically, the services have hesitated to unify logistics, stemming from the fear of violating their organizational essence. The services have a deeply rooted propensity to retain control over *organizing, training, and equipping* forces. 'Logistics is a service responsibility' is a doctrine long associated with that propensity."<sup>5</sup>  
(emphasis provided)

## **CONTINGENCY PLANNING**

### **Concern**

Mr. Henry E. Eccles defined strategy as "the comprehensive direction of power toward the attainment of broad objectives or aims."<sup>6</sup> He said logistics is

“the provision of physical means by which power is exercised by organized forces.”<sup>7</sup> He saw strategy and logistics as an overlapping and interacting process.<sup>8</sup> Although this analogy deals with a specific nations’ ability, it equally applies to the coordination efforts of any multi-functional, multi-organizational structure conducting any OOTW.

Colonel Roger W. Mickelson, USA (Ret) concludes that functional procedures at the strategic and operational level are best addressed through historical lessons learned.<sup>9</sup> Meeting OOTW goals and objectives requires explicit logistic planning based on past experiences. The following logistics concerns must be considered at the planning stages: leadtime, organization and support systems, end state, economy of resources, flexibility, communications, residual assets, strategic lift, standardization, technical support, logistics intelligence, force tailoring, environmental concerns, formats, procedures, accounting, and support functions.<sup>10</sup>

Many OOTW assignments result from United Nations initiatives that are coordinated at the UN and Commander in Chief (CINC) level. The US military operates on well defined standard operating procedures (SOPs) and has logistics experts to support OOTW. “One of the most important factors hindering UN peacekeeping operations has been the lack of operating procedures and principles for providing logistics support for all phases of UN operations.”<sup>11</sup> Despite a formal chain of command and administration for UN logistics, the UN lacks enough professional logisticians and personnel with training and



experience in military logistics.<sup>12</sup> Circumstances driving UN operations often require an ad hoc composition of military and other agency participation. Without well defined and coordinated UN or CINC logistics plans these operations are difficult to conduct.

Unlike the US military, the UN does not have formal training exercises for OOTW that test all available resources under various situations. The Army Course for “Logistics in Operations Other Than War” states that NGOs willingness to cooperate with the military vary depending on the situation.<sup>13</sup> The UN, NGOs, PVOs, US military and other agencies have disparate agendas. Cooperation among competing agencies is guarded until trust is established. Teamwork is required to accomplish effective logistics support. Careful consideration at the UN and CINC level can ensure readiness for dealing with such difficulties.

“The ‘train as we fight’ mentality (in US Service doctrine) must be inculcated in logistics units as intensely as in combat arms units.”<sup>14</sup> This principle applies to logistics support at every level to succor OOTW. “Each of the potential OOTW environments requires logisticians to tailor their mission analysis and course of action.”<sup>15</sup> Logisticians must coordinate efforts with multiple governments and agencies and train for these distinctive logistical situations.

US armed forces have developed lesson’s learned and ad hoc checklists from past operations, but there is no generic guide to use for OOTW logistics

planning.<sup>16</sup> Formal procedures for logistics preparedness to support OOTW are hard to find. Peacetime logistics support may be sufficient for OOTW.

Nonetheless, logistics coordinators must account for the potential of escalation as they plan their support mission.

### **Recommendation**

As US forces become more involved in OOTW, “the roles and training opportunities for logisticians are not diminished.”<sup>17</sup> Early and proper logistics support is a requirement for logistics success. Contingency planning must include all aspects of potential needs. These include what can fit into an aircraft for rapid deployment, who will be in charge of various operations, and what is needed when the forces arrive.

The UN needs standard operating procedures (SOPs) for use in OOTW situations. Major Rodney A. Mallette provides four important reasons for such SOPs. He lists these in his article “Logistics for UN Peacekeeping Operations:”

- First, the SOP's will outline how logistics requirements, support, and services will be identified and provided. This will eliminate the need for each new UN mission to develop and establish its own SOP's.

- Second, the SOP's will establish a clear delineation of logistics responsibilities between the UN and contributing nations. This will eliminate any confusion among the components of the peacekeeping force and mission staffs about the responsibilities of UN departments for various logistics functions. Duplication of effort by contributing nations and misdirection of requests for support will be checked.

- Third, the SOP's will set basic procedures to be used within a mission for requesting, obtaining, providing, and accounting for

logistics support services. This will create a consistent approach to logistics for all existing and future UN operations. Such consistency will contribute to economies of scale and streamline logistics planning.

- Finally, the existence of the SOP's will make it possible for national elements expected to serve with the UN to be briefed in advance on how logistics will be provided.<sup>18</sup>

The CINC's, UN and other nations also have logistical lessons learned from OOTW operations. These assessments need integration into contingency planning and exercises and coordination between the UN, US military, NGOs, PVOs, Country Teams, and coalition forces. This can be accomplished by the centralized collection of operational and tactical lessons learned, and the analysis of same. Representatives from each organization involved in OOTW would provide this assessment and generate solutions to common problems.

After review of the solutions, agency headquarters should conduct "war games" to test the solutions. This will help decide the various courses of actions and assignment of responsibilities based on the agencies involved in future operations. There are numerous possibilities for OOTW, and each probability cannot be addressed. Nonetheless, tailoring each exercise to specific circumstances involving a mix of agencies, will yield valuable training. Formal plans, subject to constant review, is the ultimate result of these efforts.

An October 1994 conference, at Carlisle Barracks, PA, reviewed lessons learned for the Rwanda relief operation.<sup>19</sup> That conference provided excellent recommendations for consideration. Nevertheless, I could find no evidence of

the recommendations being exercised to ensure they work, nor any formal procedures developed for future OOTW situations.

Domestic scenarios may involve US military forces working with local law enforcement and/or disaster relief organizations. These OOTW conditions need the same coordination and exercise planning. Plans thus developed will ensure that everyone involved has access to the same information as those for international developments.

## **COMMAND AND CONTROL**

### **Concern**

Delineating functional responsibilities is integral to the successful planning and execution of operations. As stated before, "logistics is a service responsibility." In OOTW situations the abilities of other nations and the various agencies working in the area are easily forgotten. In Rwanda, for example, Major General Hubert G. Smith, Commander of the 21<sup>st</sup> THEATER Army Area Command (TAACOM) said: "We had more capability to send into the theater; but it was not required by virtue of other nations quickly coming on line, and other non-governmental organizations coming on line and bringing their capability to bear. Along with our not anticipating other nation's capabilities was the fact that request for supplies and equipment went through multiple layers of headquarters' staffs before reaching TAACOM's logistics operations center. This resulted in duplicate requests and inefficient use of valuable resources."<sup>20</sup>

Logistics customers in OOTW consists of more than US soldiers. Additionally, logistics responsibilities carry implied tasks that differ according to the situation. Other agencies will request logistics support from the US as well as a multitude of additional requirements. These implied tasks and additional logistics requirements must be assigned to specific agencies to ensure that they are completed and that unity of effort is provided at all levels. In Haiti (UPHOLD DEMOCRACY) NGO's flooded the Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center (HACC) with requests for assistance.<sup>21</sup> Because clear assignment of responsibilities had not been delineated the US forces had difficulty completing every task in a timely manner.<sup>22</sup> Obviously this did not provide an equitable nor agreeable working relationship with the other agencies involved.

### **Recommendation**

Effective logistics support for OOTW requires exceptional coordination and appropriate assignment of responsibility to organizations contributing to the effort. Everyone must be aware of each agency's goals, agenda, intent and know "who is responsible for what."<sup>23</sup> Flexibility, availability, capacity, and the ability of an agency to complete its function must be identified.

To accomplish this mission the leadership of the logistics support team must:

- meet the leadership of other militaries, governments, and agencies involved in the mission, and learn their mission focus<sup>24</sup>

- understand that each OOTW environment requires the logisticians to tailor their logistics support accordingly<sup>25</sup>
- "assign responsibilities according to capabilities and capacities of each organization or agency. Each one brings some form of logistics support to the environment that must be utilized to provide the maximum synergy possible....every effort must be made not to embarrass another nation...some nations will not be able to carry their portion of the load because they lack training, equipment, or both. The logistics chain of command should always bear this in mind when providing direction to its elements."<sup>26</sup>
- ensure that the logistics command and control (C2) element arrive as early as possible.<sup>27</sup>
- combat the loss of continuity, degradation in unity of effort and the need to restart the process caused by the high turnover of personnel. The Department of the Army has a Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) contract in place to provide numerous construction, logistics, food and housekeeping services. This contract has been successfully used in RESTORE HOPE, CONTINUE HOPE, SUPPORT HOPE, VIGILANT WARRIOR and UPHOLD/MAINTAIN DEMOCRACY.<sup>28</sup>

- use automation, such as the Army's Automatic Identification (AIT) system, to improve in-transit visibility and the ability to reroute material to achieve a more Just-in-Time logistics operation.<sup>29</sup>
- Use the staff judge advocate to ensure Title X limits on employment of US military assets are not violated.<sup>30</sup>

## **LOGISTICS ON ARRIVAL**

### **Concern**

OOTW variables such as location, composition of forces and agencies involved, local infrastructure, personalities of key personnel, and others affect the success of logistics support functions. The logistics support leadership must know what is available and what the forces need when they arrive. Early arrival of logistics personnel to review the situation helps to ensure availability of sufficient resources to support the mission.

The logistics team cannot assume that someone else is taking care of a function or that a job is being performed. Mr. Jeffrey L. Holmes (Logistics Mobilization Officer, Ft. Sam Houston, TX) made the statement "Don't assume anything at all."<sup>31</sup> This statement was about reserve units preparing for medical mobilization for the Gulf War. It is applicable to every situation and environment in support of OOTW. Mr. Holmes also stated that "There is no such thing as too much coordination."<sup>32</sup> These seem like obvious planning and execution requirements, but they are all too often forgotten. When forgotten, it

allows logistics planners to fall short of their goals and significantly reduce timely and successful logistics efforts.

The US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, in their "Logistics in Operations Other Than War" course book, identify logistics areas of concern as: lead-time, organization and support systems, end state, economy of resources, flexibility, communications, residual assets, strategic lift, standardization, technical support, logistics intelligence, force tailoring, environmental concerns, formats and procedures, accounting and support functions.<sup>33</sup> Often some areas are overlooked when preparing to deploy. Immediate awareness of the availability of the critical items listed below is imperative by logistics planners:

- available infrastructure in the country
- communications capabilities of host nations
- current local vendor contracts in place
- available supplies and services: e.g., fuel (does it meet US refining requirements), potable water and food (approved by the US Army Veterinary Service), trucking, material handling equipment, and airport and seaport access agreements
- facilities available to feed and house troops
- protocol of the local government and populace (e.g., working hours, pay scale, language, local customs)



- capability and capacity of airports and seaports
- condition of the country's highway and railroad system
- required security measures to receive, move, and store material
- contributions by other supporting nations and agencies

### **Recommendation**

The infrastructure maturity of the region where logistics support is based is important. To obtain information about the logistics support site, early arrival of logistics planners is essential. Upon arrival they must meet with all governments and/or agencies that will be assisting in the OOTW. This includes the Country Team, US Agency for International Development (USAID), PVOs, NGOs, UN and host nation representatives. The support capabilities of nations adjacent to the "crisis nation" must be assessed because they may be used as trans-shipment points or forward logistics nodes for the support effort.

The most important contacts to develop are these aforementioned organizations and agencies.<sup>34</sup> They are knowledgeable of the circumstances (or similar situations) and know the environment, government, customs, capabilities and attitude of the local populace. This information along with visiting sites and talking with the local populace, will furnish the logistics planner with an up-to-date human intelligence (HUMINT) assessment of the area.

Local contracts are required to provide some support and services. Seeking the advice of on-site agencies, involved in the OOTW, will help to determine which companies will provide the best support at the best price.

These contacts will help evaluate the availability of assets and quality of service in the area. Early identification of shortfalls will allow transport of required items to the area first. Delivery of material can be a disaster if the forklifts (a first priority) needed to off load the plane have not arrived in theater!

The advance logistics party must evaluate the availability of responsive communications systems in the host country. Most third-world countries' telephone services are unreliable. It is often difficult to establish service, and is usually very expensive. The advance party needs to take a satellite capable communications system with them and all necessary computer, facsimile, secure telephone, long-range HF Radio (to use in place of a pager system), and generators needed to power this equipment. Lack of reliable communications can hamper the ability of the logisticians to properly prepare and execute their responsibilities.

One consideration, that must be investigated when working in a foreign nation, is the possibility of using a husbanding agent support contract. This is a system long used by the US Navy for support in areas where limited or no US military support is available. The Naval Regional Contracting Center places a contract with a local company to provide all services required by visiting ships. That contract specifies the husbanding agent's fees, services provided, price of each service, and allows the ship to obtain services not specifically addressed in the contract.

This is an excellent consideration for working in an immature area where the capabilities of vendors are not well known. Using one local agent to obtain required services that are difficult to obtain from stateside sources has great potential to help logistics organizers. Usually these services include emergent needs, potable water, transportation, billeting, and material handling equipment requirements.

Implied benefits from this type of contract are: one vendor knows the sources that will reliably comply with requirements, is knowledgeable of the customs and language, recognizes ethnic divisions, tribal loyalties, political sympathies, health considerations and ensures quick accomplishment of transactions. The agent has a working relationship with most vendors he will conduct business with. This can be a huge benefit when working with the many unknown factors of a new location.

The only potential volatility with using a one source agent is monopoly. Obtaining information from the US Embassy, USAID, NGOs, and PVOs will provide important intelligence on which companies are reputable. The contract should be written requiring the husbanding agent to provide the fairest prices and best service possible to ensure a monopoly does not exist.

## **A BOLD IDEA**

The discussion above provides concerns and recommendations concerning lack of unity in logistics to support OOTW. To obtain the organization needed to properly plan, coordinate and execute logistics for OOTW this function needs to be given to one agency. The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) is the natural choice because DLA "...provides supply support, contract administration services and technical and logistics services to all branches of the military and to several civilian agencies."<sup>35</sup>

As the responsible agency, DLA would conduct contingency planning with appropriate agencies to tailor plans to meet specific requirements. Fewer plans would be developed and one generic check-list could be perfected to provide continuity to OOTW logistics support.

When the US military is called on to support OOTW, DLA would take the lead to set up command and control of logistics support under operational control of the supported CINC. They would be the contracting agent for local contracts, liaison with all agencies and armed forces, and be the first on the ground to ensure effective logistics support is immediately provided.

## **CONCLUSION**

*The problem is to grasp, in innumerable special cases, the actual situation which is covered by the mist of uncertainty, to appraise the facts correctly and to guess the unknown elements, to react to a decision quickly and then to carry it out forcefully and relentlessly.*

Helmuth von Moltke, 1800-1891

In the context of OOTW, logistics support must be expanded to encompass not only military units but also support to multinational military observers, civilian police, civilian staff members from numerous UN agencies, and specialists from contributing nations.<sup>36</sup> The variety of situations involved in OOTW contingencies (e.g., humanitarian assistance, counter-drug operations, peacekeeping operations, combating terrorism, disaster assistance, show of force, attacks and raids, NEO operations) that effect the logistics commander is continuous. Every effort must be made to evaluate the dynamic circumstances, environment, demographics, logistics infrastructure and capabilities of involved entities. The logistics commander must also be ready to transition from the present OOTW environment to war.

US Forces usually take the lead in logistics support, but must not underestimate the abilities of other governments and agencies whose experience must be utilized. With US forces dwindling, the synergistic benefit derived from the proper use of all available resources must be recognized. This is particularly true with the lack of a forward-deployed logistics chain that US

forces once possessed. Every agency involved in the logistics effort must be co-located in the same headquarters for proper communications and coordination.

Rarely will time allow for adequate planning of logistics support for a crisis OOTW situation. The assessment of the host nation, theater and other agency support capabilities must be completed early in the process. It is paramount that lessons learned be evaluated, incorporated into exercise contingencies and “war gamed” to ensure newly implemented strategies will serve logistics support functions.

US forces must recognize that we will be involved in OOTW in the foreseeable future. Although US forces do a good job in supporting individual services, little has been done to plan for the variety of OOTW scenarios. The exception is that the US Army has put detailed effort in OOTW logistics planning. They have numerous articles written on the subject and have a course for their logistics experts to attend to help understand and plan for these contingencies.

The US military must recognize there is no umbrella under which all potential organizations work to accomplish OOTW logistics efforts. US forces must take the lead to organize, plan and train, with other organizations, for these crisis situations. Waiting for the crisis to launch US forces into the effort is too late.

## ENDNOTES

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<sup>1</sup> U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Joint Vision 2010," undated, p. 24

<sup>2</sup> John G. Roos, "Force-projection Logistics: Total Asset Visibility from Factory to Foxhole," Armed Forces Journal International, September-October 1994, 32.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

<sup>4</sup> James E. Sisk, Major, "Logistics in Operations Other Than War," Army Logistician, January-February 1994, 11.

<sup>5</sup> Christopher R. Papparone, LTCOL, "Case for a Unified Logistics Command," Army Logistician, March-April 1995, 3.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., 2.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

<sup>9</sup> Roger W. Mickelson, Colonel, "Principles of Logistics," Army logistician, May-June, 1995, 21.

<sup>10</sup> U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Logistics In Operations Other Than War (CGSC A493), (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: 1997), 18.

<sup>11</sup> Rodney A. Mallette, Major, "Logistics for UN Peacekeeping Operations," Army Logistician, January-February 1994, 22.

<sup>12</sup> CGSC A493, 14-15.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., 95.

<sup>14</sup> William M. Causey, Jr., Colonel, "Ten Lessons Learned as a Division Support Commander," Army Logistician, May-June 1994, 40.

<sup>15</sup> Sisk, 9.

<sup>16</sup> The only exception to this is the Army's FM 701-58 Planning Logistics Support for Military Operations. It has a contingency operations logistics checklist to review the myriad of tasks that supporters must consider.

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<sup>17</sup> Rodger A. Oetjen, Major, "Logistics in a Counterdrug Operation," Army Logistician, July-August 1994, 29.

<sup>18</sup> Mallette, 23.

<sup>19</sup> "Perspective on Rwanda Support," Army Logistician, May-June 1995, 6.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., 5-6.

<sup>21</sup> Nancy C. Henderson, Captain, "Civil Affairs and Logistics in Haiti," Army Logistician, (undated), <<http://almc.army.mil/orgnizatn/alog/mayjun/ms922.html>> (18 April 1997).

<sup>22</sup> Ibid.

<sup>23</sup> Mickelson, 23.

<sup>24</sup> Sergio A. Tufo, Captain, "Logistics Support of International Operations," Army Logistician, September-October 1995, 7.

<sup>25</sup> Sisk.

<sup>26</sup> Mallette, 26.

<sup>27</sup> Causey, 38.

<sup>28</sup> CGSC A493, 259-267.

<sup>29</sup> Roos, 31.

<sup>30</sup> Hinderson, 3.

<sup>31</sup> Jeffrey L. Holmes, "Garrison Logistics for Mobilization and Deployment," Army Logistician, March-April 1994, 34.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid., 35.

<sup>33</sup> CGSC A493, 18-20.

<sup>34</sup> Hinderson, 1.

<sup>35</sup> Defense Logistics Agency, Facts about The Defense Logistics Agency, (Fort Belvoir, VA: November 18, 1996), 1.

<sup>36</sup> Mallette, 22.



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